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Abstract. In finance and economics, 
selectin outcome distribution. 
maximization strategies commonly proceed by 
zizjz-3. 
In contrast, marketing strategies attempt to 
lstnbutions in some optimal manner. A model is presented for such a 
strategy--maximizing the chances of achieving some uncertain action such as 
purchasing a particular product or voting for a particular candidate. The prob- 
ability that a member of some population will perform this action is maximized by 
changing the distribution of the attitude toward the action. The model is 
constructed using the framework of classical economic production theory. The 
expected probability of the action is maximized under a promotional budget con- 
straint. The decision variables considered are the moments of the attitude distri- 
bution and an attitude/action threshold. 
Keywords. Marketing; product positioning; attitude change; risk taking. 
INTRODUCTION 
Our stochastic model follows a tradition of 
similar deterministic economic models concern- 
ing advertising, goodwill and sales. See for 
example Nerlove and Arrow (1962), Dhrymes 
(1962), Thompson and Proctor (1969). Hochman 
and Hochman (1975). 
However, in this paper we replace goodwill with 
attitude as the considered intervening variable 
linking promotion with sales. Goodwill sumnari- 
zing the effect of current and post-advertising 
outlays on demand, has an economic dimension. 
In contrast the attitude construct providing an 
overall measure of affect toward the product-- 
based on the perception of the product attri- 
butes and their importance is more naturally 
considered an intervening variable in marketing 
in particular and in social psychology in 
general. 
There is, however, conflicting evidence concern- 
ina the usefulness of the attitude construct as 
a iredictor of behavior. Katona (1960, 1975). 
Achenbaum (1966), Day (1970a, 197Db), Ginter 
(1974) all obtained positive empirical results 
relating attitude to sales. On the other hand 
Tittle and Hill (1967). Wicker (1969), Sheth 
(1974) have observed that other intervening 
variables (e.g. intentions, situational 
effects, budgetary restrictions) may cause the 
attitude/behavior relationship to be unstable. 
Clarifying further the attitude/behavior 
relationship Ajzen and Fishbein (1977) have 
identified necessary conditions for attitude 
to be a successful predictor of behavior. The 
attitudinal and behavioral entities must agree 
or converge on the elements of action, target, 
context and time. Fishbein and Ajzen (1974) 
also concluded that whenever a single act is 
the direct result mostly of an evaluation as 
is the case in voting, the attitude measure 
should be a good predictor of behavior. Day 
and Deutscher (1982) have identified contexts 
in which attitude is a stable predictor of 
sales, for example when companies with a full 
line brand mix support their national brands. 
In this paper we take into account the effect 
of the contextual restrictions and the effect of 
other intervening socioeconomic variables by 
assumina an attitudinal threshold level. Once the 
consume& attitude level is higher than the thres- 
hold level he translates his attitude into be- 
havioral action. 
The probability of an action is thus assumed to 
depend on the threshold level (which can be 
segment specific) and on the attitude distribu- 
tion. In this expository stage it is convenient 
to follow Thurstone (1927) and assume the attitude 
to be normally distributed. Affecting the mean 
and standard deviation of the attitude distribu- 
tion the marketer changes the probability of 
passing the attitude/behavior threshold‘level and 
thus the probability of action. 
Due to space limitations we present here only one 
basic theorem concerning the marketer's optional 
strategy for the case of a Bernoulli sales func- 
tion. and onlv a sketch of its oroof is orovided. 
Further details and extensive development of the 
subject are provided in Hibshoosh (1985). 
MODEL AND ANALYSIS 
To increase expected sales the marketer tries to 
alter the mean u and standard deviation II of A-- 
the normal distribution of the consumer attitude. 
The initial levels of u and (I at the beginning of 
the marketing period are denoted as u. and o. 
respectively and the planned terminal values of 
v and o are-denoted ut and ot, respectively. 
To simplify the treatment, we introduce several 
assumptions: (a) The consumer performs the same 
exact behavioral act S (say, purchases exactly the 
same number of units of the product) once his 
attitude is above the threshold level a, regard- 
less of the attitude level. For any given 
attitude distribution and threshold level a the 
probability of exceeding a is fixed. Hence S has 
the structure of a Bernoulli trial and we refer 
to S as a Bernoulli sales function. (b) The 
attitudinal threshold level a is assumed unaltered 
or equivalently the than es considered by the 
marketer are in u-a. (cs The consumer bases sales 
purchasing decisions on the terminal values 
ut' ot. (d) On the budget constraint we assume 
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(i) Pu,(Po) the unit cost for changing (U,(J) 
is fixed and (ii) the unit cost of increasing 
or decreasing u (u) is identical, regardless 
of the direction of the change. Assuming that 
the marketer possesses a budget size 8, we can 
express the marketer expected sales maximiza- 
tion problem: 
b) Maximize u for 
Max E(S/A(W), a) 
(11.(J) 
s.t. A s N(u.o) (1) 
B L Pulu-u01 + Polo-o01 
For space limitation we provide below only a 
single theorem and a sketch of its proof 
illustrating the rationale and style of the 
analysis in the extensive paper Hibshoosh 
(1985). 
ncorenl 2 
Case a 
o- 
FIG. 1. The geometry of sales maximization 
for Bernoulli sales function, attitude 
distributed normally, and 
threshold level a. 
Theorem 1. Given: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
S, a Bernoulli sales function which 
depends on the consumer attitude level A 
and a fixed threshold level a, a E A. 
The attitude measure is normally distri- 
buted A 2r N(u,o) and the initial para- 
meter values are u0, o0. 
A budget B for changing the levels of 
u and o, and Pu, Po are the unit costs of 
such changes. Then: 
i) The optimal strategy for expected 
sales maximization will almost 
everywhere consist of a corner 
solution, i.e., manipulation of 
either u or o, but not a mixture of 
both. 
ii) The optimal strategy: 
a) Maximize o for 
B 
+P P 
.O>.2_2!_2,_~ 
(8) 
uO-a 1~0 - a P o 
-E 
u. + pu O>&=-<_ I;i 
0 u. - a P o 
c) Maximize u for 
Jl= % P 
+-a +B -a 
"0 P 
>f 
u 
(3) 
d) For 
o0 o0 
P 
o<---= 
ut-a +S_, 
(5) 
uo P 
U 
(i) if u. < a, increase ut to ut =a+ 
and minimize o to o t = 0, 
(ii) For u 
0 
> a minimize 0 to o t = 0,. 
Sketch of Proof 
A. Since the attitude distribution is normal, the 
iso expected sales curves are linear rays origina- 
ting at (a.0) and ordered counterclockwise accord- 
ing to expected sales level. We also could 
establish the relevant budget constraint segments 
as piecewise linear. It is convenient to estab- 
lish a new rectangular coordinate system parallel 
to u, o in the regular P, o plane, with an origin 
in (a.0). From now on we will refer to the first 
(I) and second (II) quadrant in this coordinate 
system (the third and fourth quadrants are clearly 
irrelevant as c > 0 by definition). Let e(n') be 
P P 
the ray through (a,O) with slope - I$ $ 
0 
P.(J.') is located in the II (I) quadrint. 
o 
See 
Fig. 1. 
B. Assume that both uO, o. and (ut, oC) are 
located in the quadrant II. In this event only 
strategies of increasing u, o, or both would 
result in the increased probability for A > a and 
should be considered. The relevant budget line is 
a segment with end points: 
(uO,ot) = (II,, o0 o + F)% (lJt.oo) = ho + ;, Do). 
lJ 
This budget line segment has a negative slope of 
P 
- $ and thus parallels the ray II. 
o 
Case a. 
Assume the case where the budget line is located 
below and parallel to 11. In this case clearly: 
B 
at 
oo+p;c P 
-=-> l- 
uO-a PO-a 5 
(6) 
Pass a ray ia' from (a.0) through (ut,qO), 
((uO,ot)). See Fig. 1. ea'(ka) corresponds to 
the highest isosales curve achievable with the 
given budget under mean (variance) maximization. 
Since the end points of the budget segment are on 
&a and La', the interior of the segment is located 
between m and La'. 
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The sl:pe of ,@I ’ is smaller in absolute value 
than f as it lies below 1. Having a slope 
smaller'in absolute value than that of the 
budget line and passing through the end point 
of the budget line (oo, ut), ti' will inter- 
sect line u = uO at (po,u'), where (uo,o') is 
below (uD,ut). Ray Q passes through (uo,ot) 
increased further within budget B but will 
yield no additional expected sales. 
(ii) If (uO,uO) is in the second quadrant and the 
budget line lies below II, then as in 
Case d(i) the budget line must intersect the 
abscissa o = 0. In this case, too, it is 
easy to establish as in Case d(i) above, 
that o should be minimized without altering 
u. If the budget is sufficiently large 
and like !Za' it originates at (a,O). Therefore 
&a lies above @' and the interior of the 
budget segment. Hence na represents the 
highest level of expected sales achievable in 
this case and the corresponding optimal 
strategy is based only on attitude variance 
maximization. 
b. Case 
Assume the case where the budget line is 
located in the second quadrant above and 
parallel to II. In this case clearly 
B 
ot oo + % 
P 
-=-'-f uO-a Fro-a 
(7) 
By passing rays from (a,O) through the end 
points of the budget segment and using argu- 
ments similar to case a, case b is establish- 
ed. 
c. Case 
Assume the end point (00. ut) to be located in 
the first quadrant. In this case only a 
strategy of maximizinq u and minimizing o is 
considered. The relevant budget 
P 
segment is positively sloped and valued f 
o 
(a0 > $&) then the marketer will bring his 
0 
u tobeo=O. Using only part of the 
b$dget, he is able to bring his ES to 1. Of 
Of course, if he wishes he can utilize the 
result of the budget to further increase u. 
but that will not yield him higher expected 
sales. 
INFERENCE OF REVEALED PROMOTIONAL STRATEGIES 
the controversy the greater the number of voters 
who will switch to the challenqer's camo. However 
The results obtained in Theorem 1 demonstrate 
often observed aspects of the promotional life- 
cycle. Consider an example taken from the 
political arena. Two candidates are running for 
political office. One of the candidates is a 
well-known incumbent while the other is an unknown 
challenger. Initially the incumbent often has a 
tremendous advantage. His image (the population's 
average attitude toward him) is more favorable 
than that of his opponent. His personal qualities 
and positions are known to the public and he is 
often less controversial than the challenger. 
What is then the optimal strategy for the unknown 
challenger? Initially, it is usually difficult to 
significantly increase his inferior public image. 
It is less difficult to gain voters by appearing 
to espouse controversial positions. This strategy 
will annoy many voters and increase their dislike 
for him but at the same time will increase support 
among the extremists who will now prefer him to 
the incumbent. Assuming no shift in his image and 
svmnetrical distribution of attitude, the greater 
(Contrast with Case b.), 
Assume the budget line to be located above and 
parallel to II'. Then clearly: 
'0 'u 
-'T* 
(8) 
ut - a 
By arguments similar to case b; it is easily 
established that only strategies of attitude- 
mean-maximization should be followed to 
achieve sales maximization. 
Case 
As in Case c, the relevant budget segment is 
positively sloped and parallels 11, but unlike 
Case c, it lies below the ray II'. We dis- 
tinguish between two cases according to 
whether (p,,. on) is located in the first or 
there is a diminishing return of switched votes 
with increasing controversy. In order to gain an 
election one must gain a majority vote. Therefore 
the challenger will stop emphasizing his con- 
troversial image and will focus instead on improv- 
ing the public attitude toward him. In this 
state, higher gains in switched votes will result 
from image improvement (compared with increased 
controversy). If attitude is normally distri- 
buted, once the expected attitude toward the 
challenger surpasses that of his opponent he will 
gain a majority vote. 
If the candidate's next goal is to increase his 
majority margin, he will only be able to do so if 
he can win those voters repelled by his initial 
controversial appeal. This move is likely to 
annoy his most loyal backers, many of whom will be 
somewhat disappointed, but will vote for him 
anyhow. On the other hand, many of his previous 
” ” 
the second quadrant. 
(i) If (!+,oo) is in the second quadrant and 
opponents will join his camp. Illustrations of 
this process abound in many political elections, 
and similarly in the promotional life cycles of 
other new and old products. 
the budget line lies below L then the 
budget line must intersect the abscissa 
(I = 0. 
Since V(ut,ot) such that ut > a ct = 0 
ES = ,I. the marketer can achieve sales 
maximization by reducing u to 0 and 
increasing u from uO to a+. P can be 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The stochastic nature of most marketing problems 
differs from that of finance or economics. A 
distinctive feature of the marketing approach is 
its focus on change of distributions while finance 
and economics focus on selection of distributions. 
The model presented here sought to capture this 
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distinguishing characteristic of the marketing 
approach in its handling of risk. 
Our results indicate that in many contexts of 
marketing the optimal strategy of the marketer 
would be to emphasize changing the central 
tendency of the attitude distribution or its 
spread but not both, and that in different 
stages in the diffusion cycle the marketer 
would have to switch strategies. We can also 
infer that on and off strategies based on 
gradual allocation of resources to promotional 
campaigns are inefficient, as they may lead to 
conflicting efforts (increasing and reducing 
the distribution spread) during the duration 
of the campaign. 
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